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Acute Symptoms of Chronic Problems: Japan's
Procrastination in Solving Its Banking
Crisis, the Current Situation and a
Future Perspective
Dafei Chen
INTRODUCTION
Media coverage of the Japanese banking problem in late
1998 reached amazing proportions. The Wall Street Journal, the
New York Times and other major publications all carried numer-
ous articles dealing with the topic. Japan became the focus of
the world, not because of its miraculously successful economy,
but rather because of the threat it posed of precipitating a world
recession.1 In the wake of this threat, the sentiment, "if only
Japan would listen," has become connom among foreign govern-
ments, executives, and commentators. 2 Despite the variety of
suggestions, there seems to be a consensus that Japan should
reform its banking system, close hopeless banks and inject pub-
lic funds into the "ailing but viable banks." It has also been sug-
gested that Japan follow accepted international standards of
practice, update its banking laws and practice stricter banking
supervision and regulation. Critics say that as long as Japan
follows their advice, it can escape the Asian Financial Crisis and
prosper again. Unfortunately, reform suggestions are more eas-
ily given than followed. The ramifications of banking reform
necessarily make such reform difficult to carry out.
The objective of this Note is to provide a comprehensive
background of the Japanese banking reform and analyze why
the nature of any reform will be a long-term project instead of
the quick rescue to the Japanese economy that a lot of people
expect. Part I details the background of the Japanese banking
reform, including the burst of the bubble economy in the early
90's; existing banking laws; the roles of the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Financial Supervisory
Agency (FSA); and the recent steps taken to tackle the banking
1. See Brian Bremner, Until its Hidden Debt Mess is Cleared Up, No Re-
covery is Possible, BUS. WK., May 8, 1998, at 136.
2. See id.
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problems in Japan. Part II analyzes the difficulties of imple-
menting the banking reforms given such a background. Part III
makes some suggestions as to what Japan can do in the short-
term, as well as in the long-term, to revive its banking system.
This Note concludes that the policymakers around the world
should face the reality that it will take years for Japan to clean
up its troubled banking system, and the success of the reform
requires the determination to act and the flexibility to respond
to changing circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT BANKING REFORM
A. THE BUBBLE ECONOMY AND THE SPECULATIVE BEHAVIOR OF
THE BANKING SYSTEM
People like to refer to the Japanese speculative boom in the
1980's as the Bubble Economy. 3 The Bubble Economy in Japan
had its origin in the 1985 Plaza Accord that was designed for
economic policy coordination among the major industrialized na-
tions.4 Under the agreement, Japan would enhance domestic
demand and reduce its trade surplus. 5 To fulfill its commit-
ments, Japan adopted fiscal stimulation measures6 , reduced the
official discount rate7 and conducted a lenient monetary policy.8
The BOJ reduced the official discount rate five times between
January, 1986 and February, 1987, leaving it finally at 2.5 per-
cent.9 As a result, the money supply outpaced the growth of the
gross domestic product (GDP), inflation was virtually nil, and
"the Japanese stock market responded with a massive rally."10
From 1980 to the beginning of 1989, Japanese stock markets
rose from accounting for only fifteen percent of the value of all
markets worldwide to more than forty-two percent."
The boom was not limited to the stock market, however.
The real estate market simultaneously skyrocketed. 12 In Tokyo,
residential prices rose annually by approximately seventy per-
cent, while commercial real estate rose by about eighty per-
3. See CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY 2 (1992).
4. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Econ-
omy, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053, 1058 (1996).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1058.
7. See id. at 1060.
8. See id. at 1061.
9. See id. at 1060.
10. Id. at 1061.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1062.
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cent.13 Japan's real estate market at the end of 1989 was
believed to be worth over V2,000 trillion ($18 trillion), four times
the estimated ¥500 trillion ($4.5 trillion) value of the American
real estate market. 14 The banking industry played an impor-
tant role behind these seemingly unbelievable expansions.
Japan's banks lent heavily against both property and
shares.' 5 At the end of June 1991, Japan's banks had lent a to-
tal of V116 trillion ($1 trillion) directly to the property and con-
struction sectors.' 6 The outstanding domestic loans of city
banks stood at about fifty percent of Japan's GNP.17 As the real
estate and share prices went up, however, the banking industry
was losing market share to securities markets, as many of the
banks' best customers substituted equity financing for bank
loans.' 8 To compensate for such losses, the banks increased fi-
nancing for real estate-based loans, increasing the demand for
real estate and driving up the prices even further.19
Worried about overheating the market and sparking infla-
tion, the BOJ adopted a policy of raising interest rates. 20 The
BOJ raised the official discount rate five times between May,
1989 and August, 1990.21 Despite the rising interest rate, the
market kept stable at near-record levels. 22 By the end of 1989,
Japan appeared to have achieved the impossible: it was sus-
taining full employment, low inflation, high economic growth, a
large trade surplus, and enormous rises in property and stock
values. 23 The conditions were so good that a measure of eco-
nomic performance that counseled caution was nonexistent.24
The Bubble Economy did not last long, however. Beginning
in 1990, stock and land prices fell sharply.25 In 1992, Japanese
13. See id.
14. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 50. This ratio was amazing because
America is twenty-five times larger than Japan in terms of its physical area.
See id.
15. See id. at 22.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Miller, supra note 4, at 1063.
19. See id. at 1064.
20. See THE STRUCTURE OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 243 (Mit-
suaki Okabe ed., 1995).
21. See id. ("Within fifteen months the rate went up from 2.5 percent to 6.2
percent, representing an increase of 140 percent.")
22. See Miller, supra note 4, at 1064.
23. See id. at 1065.
24. See id.
25. See Okabe, supra note 20, at 236.
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stock prices experienced the heaviest fall in post-war history. 26
The Nikkei Average plunged 63.2 percent from its all-time high
of 38,915 points, reached in December of 1989, to 14,309 points
in August 1992.27 The resurgence of the yen against the dollar
and other major currencies from 1990 to 1995 aggravated Ja-
pan's deteriorating economy that is heavily export-driven.28
Commercial banks that had extended large amounts of real es-
tate financing or that had speculated in the stock market boom
were among the hardest hit by the collapse of the Bubble Econ-
omy.29 Since then, the banking industry has struggled with
mountains of bad loans, reportedly at $600 billion today.30 The
Japanese economy, the second largest in the world, is currently
shrinking at five percent per year.31 Over the past eight years,
the stock market has fallen sixty percent, and since the cur-
rency's high in 1995, it has plummeted forty-three percent.3 2
Properties are worth about ten percent of their peak value.33
The Japanese economy has slid into a recession. 34
B. BANK SUPERVISION AND REGULATION IN JAPAN
1. The Financial Structure During the "Period of Rapid
Growth" (1950-1973)
From 1950 to 1973, "the policy goal of the Japanese govern-
ment was to foster economic development."35 To achieve this ob-
jective, the government tried to channel low-cost funds from
individual depositors to "designated" industries by inducing pol-
icy-conforming bank behavior. 36 "Regulated interest rates," "in-
direct financing," "window guidance and administrative
guidance" and "segmentation and strict demarcation of business
areas" were the major features of the financial structure. 37
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Miller, supra note 4, at 1067.
29. See id.
30. See Fareed Zakaria, Japan's America Problem, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3,
1998, at 39.
31. See Gary Wisby, The Japanese Crisis: Why "Bubble Economy" Burst,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 27.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Sheryl WuDunn, Japan's Economy Appears Bleaker, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1998, at Al.
35. Ulrike Schaede, The 1995 Financial Crisis in Japan (visited Sept. 28,
1998) <http://brie.berkeley.edu/BRIE/pubs/wp/wp85.html>.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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Under this structure, interest rates were not responsive to sup-
ply and demand pressures, banks dominated in corporate fi-
nancing, the central bank directly influenced the credit behavior
of the major banks, and each bank category had special laws and
regulations governance.38 In principle, the banking business
was separated from the securities business, deposit banking
from the trust business and, within the commercial banking sec-
tor, long-term from short-term finance.3 9 The "administrative
guidance" from the MOF further separated the insurance busi-
ness from banking and securities, as well as the foreign ex-
change business from deposit-taking. 40 In addition to the
functional separations achieved by the use of the law and ad-
ministrative guidance, other regulations affected most aspects of
all financial intermediaries' operations. 41 Banks had little dis-
cretion in responding to market changes.
2. The MOF, the BOJ and the FSA
Japan had a two-tier system of banking supervision: the
MOF and the BOJ.42 "[The MOF] is generally considered to be
the single most powerful entity in the national government."43
It exerts influence over all other ministries to press the Cabi-
net's policies and initiatives.44 More significantly, the MOF is
the key to the heavily integrated relationships between the cen-
tral government and the private sectors, including the banking
industry. 45 It was the primary supervisory authority for banks
38. See id.
39. See MAXIMILIAN J. B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SU-
PERVISION 86 (1994).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 91. Typically, restrictions would impinge on the sovereignty
of a private depository institution in the following aspects: the sources and uses
of funds; the terms on which they could borrow and lend; the activities in which
they could engage; their branching and merging activities; and their invest-
ment decisions with respect to holdings of other companies' stock. See id.
42. See id. at 149.
43. CHARLES F. BINGMAN, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP
AND MANAGEMENT 31 (1989).
44. See id.
45. See id. "Japan, Inc." is the term used to describe the close relationship
between business and government in Japan. See ELLIOTT J. HAHN, JAPA-
NESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 113 (1984). The Japanese
business system is a hybrid of free market and government involvement that is
unique to Japan in that the government's method of regulating the economy is
based not on the guidance of formal laws, but rather through an informal pro-
cess. See id. The government is composed of elected politicians, big business,
and the higher elements of the bureaucracy, who work together in a consensus
2000] 273
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and other financial firms. 46 For example, its Banking Bureau
was responsible for the supervision of banks and their overseas
affiliates. In addition, its Insurance Bureau supervises insur-
ance companies and oversees the deposit insurance program,
and its International Finance Bureau supervises the foreign ac-
tivities of Japanese financial firms.4 7 The MOF had authority
not only to license and inspect the banks but also to demand the
provision of business reports from any bank or a subsidiary com-
pany.4-8 Finally, it had power to approve a miscellaneous set of
banking matters, including the establishment or closing down of
branches or other business offices, changes in bank location or
type, and reductions in the level of capital held below a previ-
ously-specified minimum.49
In contrast with the powerful MOF, the BOJ's objective is
"the regulation of the currency, the control and facilitation of
credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of the
credit system, pursuant to the national policy, in order that the
general economic activities of Japan might adequately be en-
hanced."50 Thus, the BOJ has no major regulatory responsibili-
ties over the financial system.51 In its missions and activities
statement, the BOJ is to "maintain price stability and to ensure
the stability of the financial system."52 Recognizing that the
sound management of individual financial institutions is a pre-
requisite to the stable functioning of the financial system, the
BOJ also closely monitors trends in the loans and deposits of
financial institutions. The Bank's staff also regularly carries out
"on-site examinations" to review their financial and manage-
ment conditions. 53
Although the MOF and the BOJ usually collaborate their
activities, their relations are not necessarily harmonious. 54 Con-
flict over policy priority is inevitable and disagreements are corn-
framework in pursuit of what is commonly perceived as the good of Japan. See
id. at 113-14.
46. See BINGMAN, supra note 43, at 31.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Bank of Japan Law, Law No. 67 of 1942, translated in 6 DHS LAW
BULLETIN SERIES at AA-1 (1991).
51. See Okabe, supra note 20, at 378.
52. Bank of Japan, Missions and Activities of the Bank of Japan (visited
Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/mission.htm>.
53. See id.
54. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Decision-Making at the Bank of Japan, 28 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 21 (1996).
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mon because the BOJ views its primary missions to be
controlling inflation, safeguarding the payments system, and fa-
cilitating the development of a strong and competitive banking
system. On the other hand, the MOF is concerned more with
fiscal policy and political considerations. 55 Furthermore, as op-
posed to other central banks that are gaining legal independence
in both the developed and developing world, the BOJ is subject
to the plenary control of the MOF. 56 Under the Bank of Japan
Law, the BOJ has scant autonomy when its policies come into
conflict with those of the MOF. 5 7 Article 42 provides that "[t]he
Bank of Japan shall be under the supervision of the competent
Minister [i.e., the Finance Minister]."58 Article 43 provides that
the Minister of Finance "may, if deemed particularly necessary
for the attainment of the object of the Bank of Japan, order the
Bank to undertake any necessary business, or order alterations
in the By-Laws as well as other necessary actions."5 9 Although
the BOJ is not officially an arm of the MOF, its decision-making
is greatly influenced by the MOF. 60
As a crucial move in reforming Japan's bureaucracy and
subjecting the regulation of Japan's financial markets to more
public scrutiny, on June 16, 1997, Japan's parliament passed a
law that would shift the MOF's powers to regulate financial
markets to the FSA.6 ' The government established the FSA to
provide "fair and independent" scrutiny of the banking system.62
The task of the FSA is to clean up the corruption and the mis-
management in the financial system and offer consumers better
protection.6 3 So far, most analysts applauded the creation of the
agency as at least a step in the right direction to reduce the
power of the MOF, which had come under fire for maintaining
cozy ties with banks it supervised and allowing bad loans to
fester.64
55. See id.
56. See id. at 31.
57 See Bank of Japan Law, supra note 50.
58. Id., art. 42.
59. Id., art. 43 (emphasis added).
60. See Miller, supra note 54, at 5.
61. See Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Parliament Shifts Regulation of Finan-
cial Markets to a New Agency, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1997, at A14.
62. See Valerie Reitman, New Japan Bank Watchdog Faces Herculean
Task, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at Al.
63. See Alex Brummer, The Japanese Economy: Banking on Disaster, THE
GUARDIAN, July 1, 1998, at 19.
64. See Reitman, supra note 62 at A8.
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C. THE FNANcIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT OF 1992 AND THE BIG
BANG FINANCIAL REFORM OF 1998
In 1992, the Japanese cabinet agreed upon a proposed fi-
nancial reform bill and submitted it to the Diet (parliament).65
The bill passed into the Financial System Reform Act that con-
tains amendments to sixteen existing statutes, including the
laws governing most types of financial institutions.66 The Act
amends the Banking Law to permit all types of banks to partici-
pate in the private placement of securities in the secondary mar-
ket, and it grants the MOF the authority to establish capital-
adequacy requirements and other standards for judging the fi-
nancial health of banks.67 Moreover, the Act enables banks and
other depository institutions to establish securities and trust
banking subsidiaries.68 It also allows all types of depository in-
stitutions to merge or convert to a more viable format to save
troubled institutions by encouraging them to merge with
healthy ones.69 In all, the Act aims at encouraging "sufficient
competition between financial institutions" and enabling the fi-
nancial institutions to "meet the increasingly sophisticated and
diverse needs of the user."70
In 1993, the Diet implemented a wide-ranging set of re-
forms to the Japanese financial system that it had adopted as
the Financial System Reform Act.71 As the entity that drafted
the Act, the MOF sought to diversify the activities of each bank
within Japan's highly specialized banking industry to increase
competition and promote efficiency. 72 The MOF also encouraged
sound management of financial institutions, including allowing
financial managers increased independence, reinforcing the dis-
closure system, and creating provisions regulating capital ade-
quacy.73 Most significantly, the MOF relaxed the boundary
between the banking and securities industries by allowing each
to have a subsidiary competing in the other's market, aiming at
65. See Cohn P. A. Jones, Note, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analy-
sis of Recent Developments, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 387, 423 (1993).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 423-24.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 425-26.
70. Id. at 410.
71. See Brian Arthur Pomper, The Japanese Financial Reform of 1993: Will
Reform Spark Innovation?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 525, 525 (1995).
72. See id. at 527.
73. See id.
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promoting the development of new and innovative financial
products and services. 74
Contrary to what many hoped, however, the financial "re-
form," has not brought with it "deregulation" or "liberaliza-
tion.". 75 In effect, the MOF has expanded its authority to
regulate financial institutions by interpreting the ambiguous
language of the Act in its own favor.76 Interestingly enough,
nothing about the Act makes it readily apparent that its drafters
were concerned with the increasing international scope of Ja-
pan's financial markets, even though internationalization was
one of the proposed purposes of the Act.77 The Act has been im-
plemented slowly and cautiously, as a result of the MOF's con-
cern for the continued health of the existing financial
institutions and the general economy.78
In November of 1996, former Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto called for a "Japanese 'Big Bang' deregulation of fi-
nancial markets."79 Nicknamed after similar British reforms of
the 1980's, the Japanese reform aims at contributing to the .vi-
talization of Japan's economy through strengthening the com-
petitiveness of the financial institutions.80 In its report, the
Financial System Research Council ("the Council") to the MOF
provided the basic agenda for the "Big Bang." With the ultimate
purpose of creating a market that clearly reflects users' choice,
the Council made the following recommendations: (1) liberate
and diversify products, business and organizational structure;
(2) prepare the infrastructure and rules for markets and trans-
actions; and (3) secure the financial system's soundness.,'
Within each of these recommendations, the report detailed the
specific reform items, including utilizing a holding company sys-
tem and transforming loans and other assets into liquid forms
through the issuance of asset-backed securities, etc.8 2
In hopes of bolstering global confidence in Japan and setting
its economy on track for growth, the Japanese government an-
75. See Jones, supra note 65, at 427.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 435.
78. See id.
79. Edward J. Lincoln, Evaluating Japan's "Big Bang" Financial Deregula-
tion, prepared for the Trilateral Forum on U.S.-Japan-China Cooperation in the
Asia Pacific Region.
80. See The Financial System Research Council, Regarding the Reform of
the Japanese Financial System, June 13, 1997.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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nounced a long-awaited "Total Plan" to clear away the nation's
pile of bad debt.8 3 Under the Total Plan, "the government would
shut down insolvent institutions and turn over their clients to
government-run 'bridge banks.'"8 4 It would also accelerate sales
of the land held as security for the loans.85 Furthermore, the
plan aims to bring a more open financial system by increasing
disclosure and imposing rigorous inspection standards and con-
trols.8 6 In summary, the central scheme is the disposal of bad
loans through the establishment of a public bridge bank.8 7 With
this plan, the government hoped to facilitate a rebirth of the fi-
nancial system.88
D. THE Focus ON JAPAN
It was not long ago that Japan's "economic miracle" was the
wonder of the world.8 9 Japan's cars set off the alarms of car pro-
ducers in Detroit.90 The average Japanese household had sav-
ings of $100,000.91 However, that era became a sweet memory
since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997.92
On July 2, 1997, the Bank of Thailand announced a managed
float of the baht and called on the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for "technical assistance."93 The announcement effec-
tively devalued the baht by between fifteen and twenty
percent. 94
The devaluation of the Thai currency caused a series of de-
valuations by other Asian countries, especially Indonesia, Korea
and Malaysia. 95 The currency crisis sent a shock wave through
83. See Sheryl WuDunn, Japan Announces a Plan to Tackle Mountain of
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at Al.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Goldman Sachs, Total Plan Implications and Scenarios, July 14,
1998. The bridge bank will proceed in two stages. First, the bank will take over
ordinary debts and somewhat uncertain debts from financial institutions that
are deemed insolvent and maintain lines of credit under supervision by the
FSA. Second, if an insolvent financial institution cannot be sold off, the Deposit
Insurance Corporation will nationalize it. See id.
88. See WuDunn, supra note 83.
89. See Wishy, supra note 31, at 27.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and its Global Contagion
(visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/-nroubini/asia/AsiaChro-
nologyl.html>. This triggered the East Asian Crisis. See id.
93. This triggered the East Asian Crisis. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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the stock markets in Asia.96 Japan was not an exception. 97 The
Tokyo stock market fluctuated with the trends of other Asian
markets.98 When Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi took office at the
end of July 1998, he vowed to move swiftly to address Japan's
economic problems.99 He designated his Cabinet as a "Cabinet
for Economic Revival" and proposed banking and other struc-
tural reforms to restore the Japanese economy.' 00 Unfortu-
nately, more than one year after the outbreak of the Crisis,
there is still little hope of recovery.' 0 ' On September 21, 1998,
the IMF declared that the main risk to the world economy was
that Japan would not "address its financial-sector problems
while ensuring adequate domestic demand." 10 2 Adding to the
bleak picture of the future, the Japanese GDP contracted 1.8
percent for the fiscal year ending in March of 1999, a sharp re-
versal of its previous, much-maligned claim that the economy
would grow 1.9 percent.' 0 3 The Japanese problems have now
become international problems. 10 4
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and its Global Contagion
(visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/
AsiaChronologyl.html>.
99. See Stephanie Strom, Japan's New Chief Vows to Act on Economy (vis-
ited Oct. 5, 1998) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/080198japan-
obuchi.html>.
100. See Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 143rd Session
of the Diet (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http'J/www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/980810-
143diet.html>.
101. The stock market has continued to fall. On September 30, 1998, Ja-
pan's stock market fell to a 12-year low, with the benchmark Nikkei 225 index
shedding 415 points, or 3%, to close at 13406. See Bill Spindle et al, Bleak
Economy Emerges from Japanese Survey, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1998, at A16.
This is the lowest level since February 1986. See id.
102. See Time to Wake Up, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1998, at 21.
103. See Inside China Today, Japanese Government Predicts GDP to Con-
tract 1.8 Percent (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.insidechina.com/china/
aroundasia/news/03.html>.
104. See David E. Sanger, Clinton and Obuchi Break the Ice, but Solve No
Economic Problems (visited Oct. 5, 1998) <httpJ/www.nytimes.com/library/
world/asia/092398japan-us.html>. Talking about the financial reform in Japan,
Prime Minister Obuchi said that "this is not only an issue for Japan, but some-
thing that has major implications on economies of Asia as well as the whole
world." See id.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE REFORM AND ITS
CURRENT SITUATION
A. THE DEPTH OF THE BANKING PROBLEMS DETERMINE THE
LONG-TERM NATURE OF THE REFORMS
For months, American officials have become increasingly
specific about what they believe Japan must do. In April 1998,
President Clinton warned in "unusually explicit terms" that Ja-
pan must change course if it wishes to rescue its economy from a
long-term decline.105 His comment intensified the pressure by
the leaders of several of the world's strongest economic powers,
who have reiterated that Japan's economic decline and its in-
ability to absorb imports from its Asian neighbors threaten that
constituent's economic recovery' l0 6 But Asia may not be the
only area affected by Japan's failures. Indeed, American offi-
cials have a legitimate concern that the collapse of more Japa-
nese banks and securities dealers could imperil Wall Street and,
thus, the United States economy. The problem, however, is that
the world leaders' statements and warnings may cause the pub-
lic to mistakenly believe that it is the inaction of Japan, instead
of the economic trouble itself, that is endangering the world
economy.
In fact, the world already views Japan with a mixture of
pity and contempt. 10 7 If Japan fails to deal with its banking cri-
sis swiftly as a crucial first step to revitalizing its debilitated
economy, it will be branded a pariah.108 Is that fair? The coun-
try's real GDP contracted at an annual rate of 3.3 percent during
the April-June quarter of 1998, the third consecutive quarterly
decline.' 0 9 Bad debt in Japan's banks amounts to perhaps
thirty percent of the GDP.1"0 Of course, one can join Prime Min-
ister Keizo Obuchi in blaming the Japanese political leaders, the
powerful MOF and the heads of the country's huge financial in-
stitutions for wasting years before facing up to the crippling
banking crisis."' Accusations cannot solve the problem, how-
ever, and one must fully understand a problem before taking
steps to alleviate it.
105. See David E. Sanger, Clinton Warns Japan: Fire up the Economy to
Stem a Decline, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1998, at Al.
106. See id.
107. See Time to Wake Up, supra note 102, at 21.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See David E. Sanger, Tokyo Leader Blames Many for Banks' Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at A13.
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The banking crisis was directly related to the burst of the
Bubble Economy. The BOJ's lowering of the official discount
rate made bank loans virtually interest-free in Japan. 112 The
banks used a rising stock market to create bank capital and
boost their lending.' 13 By funneling the loans back into the
stocks and property markets, the banks boosted the value of col-
lateral (stocks and property) against which to lend even more
money. 1 4 In this case, the effects of regulated interest rates
were obvious. For financial institutions, profit margins were
high and predictable, and there was little pressure to cut costs
and increase efficiency. The government's limitation on the role
of the capital markets supported the bank dominance in corpo-
rate funding that also insured a sustainable high interest rate
margin. 115
The burst of the Bubble Economy eroded two important
cushions protecting financial institutions from bad debts: collat-
eral and owned capital. 1 6 Not only has the burst reduced prices
for the shares and land used to collateralize loans, but it has
also erased many of the unrealized gains on stock portfolios that
make up a large part of the capital claimed by Japanese finan-
cial institutions. 1 7 The reversed conditions that let the banks
boost their lending so dramatically during the bubble years were
the cause of the banking problems."18 First, banks can no longer
count on lending to cash-rich companies because those compa-
nies can raise money less expensively by selling securities in the
international markets." 9 To counter this problem in the past,
banks increased the number of asset-backed loans to medium
and small-sized companies and to consumers.' 20 When the
property prices collapsed, such counter measures failed and the
collateral cushion protecting banks from bad debts was taken
away. The second change in conditions was precipitated by the
deregulation of interest rates. 12' The BOJ could no longer ab-
sorb all the government bonds issued and it was impossible to
force the public to increase savings for the purpose of purchasing
112. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 12.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Schaede, supra note 35.
116. See RYUICHIRO TACHI, THE CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE
ECONOMY 203 (Richard Walker trans., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1993).
117. See id.
118. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 22.
119. See id. at 23.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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bonds. 122 In April 1991, all deposits over ¥500,000 began to
earn money market rates. 123 Instead of responding to the in-
crease in their funding costs by passing on the cost to borrowers,
the banks kept pursuing asset growth in order to boost their
share of the market. 124 Indeed, the buoyant Tokyo stock market
helped the banks to fill the operating loss with capital gains
from the sales of stocks held in their huge portfolios. 125 Unfor-
tunately, as the stock market fell, the banks' safety net of owned
capital was stripped away and the bad debts mounted
dramatically.
In 1993, the MOF and the BOJ engaged in an open debate
over the appropriate response to the deterioration of the banks'
loan portfolios. 126 The MOF argued that in the interest of finan-
cial stability, only a gradual adjustment to the banks' published
accounts was desirable, while the BOJ advocated immediate
large-scale write-offs. 127 The MOF prevailed and adopted a pol-
icy of forbearance, which allowed banks to understate the scale
of their problem loans in the hope that the passage of time
would eventually alleviate the situation. 12 This approach con-
stituted a carefully formulated scheme to enable Japanese
banks to mask the large-scale deterioration in their balance
sheets at a dangerous time in the life of the financial system.129
The result is the current critical situation in the banking
system.
Banking crises, however, do not happen only in Japan. The
U.S. Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis in the 1980s was similar to
the current Japanese banking crisis. 130 By 1989, the S&L in-
dustry nearly collapsed due to fundamental flaws in the sys-
tem's structure, changing economic conditions, deregulation and
fraud.131 The crisis took six years and $125 billion in taxpayer
money to resolve, and resulted in the closure of nearly seventy-
122. See THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 105 (Masahiko Aoki &
Hugh Patrick eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
123. See WOOD, supra note3, at 23.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See VIVIEN A. BEATTIE ET AL., BANKS AND BAD DEBTS 125
(1995).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 127.
130. See generally Wayne M. Josel, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste
Management and the S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S339, S339 (1991).
131. See id.
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five banks. 132 One unique aspect of the Japanese banking crisis
is its complex and severe nature. One can expect that its rem-
edy will take a long time, especially in light of the structure of
Japan's banking system and the mechanism of supervision.
1. Banking Supervision and Regulation Lag Behind What is
Required to Implement the Banking Reform
On October 16, 1998, the Upper House of the Japanese par-
liament formally passed legislation to pump public funds into
capital-starved institutions. 133 The passage of the bank-recapi-
talization bill clears the way for the government to draw money
from a pool of funds totaling ¥60 trillion ($545.5 million).' 34
Although the legislation is a step toward resolving the banking
crisis, by itself it is nothing more than a tool. As U.S. Treasury
officials urged in Tokyo, a quick plan is needed for the imple-
mentation of the public fund injection. 135 The problem, how-
ever, is that such a quick plan is difficult to achieve because of
economic and structural reasons. For bankers, accepting the
government's help has serious drawbacks. 136 Any bank seeking
help will alert markets to deep problems. The banks' funding
costs would certainly rise, and its share prices would get hurt.137
Admittedly, Japan could force its banks to accept public money,
but there is no guarantee that the banks will lend again, which
is the very goal of easing the current credit crunch.138 More sig-
nificantly, without the structural reform of the financial system,
especially bank regulation and supervision, Japan cannot begin
to solve the banking crisis.
As noted in the previous section, the MOF basically controls
the BOJ and the operations of banks in general.' 3 9 Banks have
little discretion with regard to their ranges of operations. On
the other hand, Japanese banks enjoy almost limitless discre-
tion concerning the treatment of bad debts. 140 They are not re-
132. See Brian Bremner, Last Chance for the Yen?, BUS. WK., July 6, 1998,
at 46.
133. See Japan Adopts Banking Measures Designed to Inject Public Money,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 19, 1998, at A23.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Bailout Packages Raise New Questions,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at A19.
137. See id.
138. See id. The BOJ reported that outstanding bank loans fell 2.7 percent
in September from the year-earlier month, the biggest decline on record. See id.
139. See supra note 46-60 and accompanying text.
140. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 41.
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quired to disclose non-performing loans, and no one in the
MOF's banking bureau has the specific task of monitoring the
adequacy of reserves against bad debts.141 Instead of the MOF
enforcing prudential standards, it is up to the banks to ask the
regulators for permission to reserve on a case-by-case basis.142
In the present context of mounting bad debts, this regulatory
attitude has provided a convenient excuse for banks to avoid
owning up to their problems. 143 Furthermore, the opaque ac-
counting practices have masked the true size of problem loans
for many years, undermining confidence among businesses and
the public at large and causing deleterious effects on domestic
demand.144
Additionally, the regulatory authorities have tried to pro-
tect banks essentially in three ways. First, the regulatory au-
thorities provided many forms of subsidies, including those
arising from interest rate regulations, entry restrictions, and
BOJ lending at the discount rate. 145 Second, the government
bore significant portions of credit risks. The MOF and the BOJ
rescued troubled banks using any possible means. 146 Third, the
authorities controlled the flow of funds through the capital mar-
ket.147 The combination of the above elements has led to the
current inability of banks to handle the crisis when the revival
of the economy depends on the confidence of the banking system.
A sound financial system depends on a trio of crucial ele-
ments: (a) independence of the central bank from short-term
political pressures; (b) enforcement of international standards
on the operations of commercial banks; and (c) special rules and
procedures for closing insolvent banks and restructuring weak
ones. 14 Bank failures are natural in an economy based on pri-
vate-sector activity. 149 However, they are different from other
types of business failures in that they can infect public confi-
dence in all banks and may cause public panic, bank runs and
even a total meltdown of a financial system.' 5 0 The potential
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See IMF, Japan's Economic Crisis and Policy Options (visited Oct. 18,
1998) <http://imfntlx.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weol098/pdf/part8.pdf>.
145. See Aoki & Patrick, supra note 122, at 105.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of
the IMF and the United States, KAN.J.L. & PUB. POLY, Spring 1998, at 70.
149. See id. at 75.
150. See id.
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risk of a systemic failure is the key reason why a country needs
special rules for handling insolvent banks. 151 Instead of recog-
nizing the necessity of closing insolvent banks, the Japanese
system has tried to avoid bank failures at all costs. 152 The MOF
arranges for stronger institutions to absorb insolvent institu-
tions through what amounts to administratively orchestrated
purchase and assumption transactions.15 3 Because a bank's fi-
nancial troubles usually stem from either bad management or
inadequate governmental supervision of the financial sector, the
avoidance of such bank failure leads the bank into even deeper
trouble.' 54 This is both detrimental to depositors and a risk to
the financial system as a whole.' 55
Finally, despite its claimed nature of "fairness and indepen-
dence," the FSA's ability to restore international credibility to
Japan's ailing banking system is far from clear. Most of its new
inspectors have no financial experience and will be learning dur-
ing on-the-job audits of the world's largest banks.'56 Moreover,
most of the members of the FSA have simply been shifted from
the MOF. 157 This casts serious doubts over the FSA's separa-
tion and independence from the influence and pressures of the
MOF. Analysts believed that the FSA came up short in the real
objective of improving transparency and oversight of the bank-
ing system.158 Furthermore, banks are attacking the FSA and
other regulating authorities for lack of knowledge of the econ-
omy and the financial industry. 5 9 Considering all of the above
factors, the FSA is far from being a powerful and efficient regu-
latory regime capable of fully resolving the current crisis in the
banking system.
151. See id.
152. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and
Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the "Jusen" Problem, 29 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 8 (1997). Japanese financial regulators set policies and
rules with the weakest member of the industry sector in mind. See id. This is
commonly referred to in Japan as a "convey" system of regulation, because the
group is allowed to move no faster than its slowest member. See id. Key as-
pects of the convey system are the avoidance of failure by financial institutions
and the informal mechanisms utilized to avoid failure. See id.
153. See id. at 8-9.
154. See Head, supra note 148, at 75-76.
155. See id. at 76.
156. See Reitman, supra note 62.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Hiroshi Ota, Financial Authorities under Fire for Meddling More
Than Helping, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 17, 1999, at 7.
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C. "BIG BANG" Is NOT As DRASTIc As IT SOUNDS
The purpose of Big Bang is to deal with a massively dys-
functional financial system that further threatens the growth of
Japan's economy. 160 It aims to achieve heightened competitive-
ness of Japanese financial sectors and unleash the enormous fi-
nancial assets held by Japanese households through better
investment options.161 As former Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto claimed, the "goal is to build a country in which in-
dependent individuals can sufficiently exercise their creativity
and boldly face challenges to realize their dreams."162
Not everyone is as optimistic, however. Most observers be-
lieve that the Big Bang reforms will not transform an economy
that has shown scant growth for seven years and that departs
from the global trend towards more open markets with
borderless finance and trade. 163 Japanese financial institutions
badly trail western competitors in their knowledge of risk man-
agement and in their ability to innovate with new invest-
ment.' 64 Most importantly, the Total Plan for financial
deregulation lacks the most crucial elements of debt forgiveness
and liquidation of collateral real estate.165 Debt forgiveness is
important because if it does not occur, the massive leverage in
the construction and real estate sectors would create the condi-
tions for a deflationary spiral and a further increase in non-per-
forming loans.166 Liquidation of real estate held as collateral is
one way of realizing economically significant debt forgiveness. 167
Unfortunately, the government downplayed the importance of
bad debt forgiveness. In the original version of the Total Plan,
the first specific measure was on final disposition of bad debts
and the work-out process of loans, the reduction of the total
debts of the real estate and construction sectors through debt
forgiveness. 168  In the second version, although the "bridge
bank" scheme and disclosure requirements were added, the Plan
160. See E. Keith Henry & Ken Okamura, Big Bang Shaping the Future of
Japan's Economy, AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN J., Mar. 1998, at 11.
161. See id.
162. See Reforms Jolt Japan Economy "Big Bang" Begins Deregulation To-
day, CIN. POST, April 2, 1998, at 6B.
163. See James Cox, Few Laud Big Bang in Japan Critics Say "Metaphori-
cally Challenged" Reform Plans Fall Short, USA TODAY, April 1, 1998, at 4B.
164. See id.
165. See Goldman Sachs, supra note 87.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Comprehensive Plan for Financial Revitalization (1st version) (vis-
ited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/980707fina-revl.html>.
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aims at creating "a secondary market with depth through the
use of such methods as bulk sales and securitization" to dispose
of bad loans.' 69 The differences in the two versions seem to sug-
gest that if there are sufficient disclosures of the bad loans and
removal of the weak banks from the financial system, both do-
mestic and overseas confidence will improve and everything will
recover. Such a way of dealing with the bad loans problems is
unsound in that without the sale of collateralized real estate, the
banks' capital usage will be insufficient and the banking system
will not recover.' 70 Furthermore, collateral disposition in Japan
is complicated by such factors as the complexity of debt relation-
ships and the high ratio of financing extended without collat-
eral.171 This is a serious situation because inefficiency in the
real estate market has a "tendency to suck everything else down
with it." 172 The fact that the Japanese economy has not shown
signs of improvement over the past several years despite all of
the economic stimulus packages and low interest rates can prove
this point.173 Analysts believed that leaving the real estate sec-
tor massively overleveraged, while reducing the number of the
banks and raising the reserve ratio, would have no significant
economic effect. 174 More importantly, banks are naturally op-
posed to pursuing debt forgiveness because it implies a wealth
transfer from the banking sector to the real economy.' 75 As a
result, the perspective of large-scale debt forgiveness is dimin-
ished, placing a significant obstacle in the way of achieving the
objective of the reform. Although regulators from the Financial
Reconstruction Commission "ordered" the nation's top banks to
"write off all their bad loans" by March 31, 1999, the end of the
fiscal year, the success of the initiative is questionable because
169. See Comprehensive Plan for Financial Revitalization (2nd version) (vis-
ited Oct. 6, 1998) <http'//www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/980707fina-rev2.html>.
170. See Goldman Sachs, Bridge Bank Great Propaganda, July 29, 1998, at
3.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Goldman Sachs, supra note 87. The banks face a conundrum. For
the property to be sold, the real estate companies will have to mark down the
property to market value. The companies cannot afford to pay interest, let
alone write down such an enormous principal loss. If the property is sold, then
the value of the property should increase theoretically. The banks wish to par-
ticipate in the increase of property value. However, the value of the property
cannot recover unless banks agree to some sort of debt forgiveness. See id.
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of the murky definition of bad loans, and the worsening
economy.'176
Additionally, the Big Bang Reforms are criticized because
they exclude the reform of Japan's Postal Savings System. l 77
Because the system accounts for over one-third of all personal
deposits in Japan, such a big part of the banking system appears
at odds with the goal of fostering a financial system governed by
market principles.178 Also, the Postal Savings System "has
some comparative advantages in attracting deposits, including
complete government deposit guarantees," and it has the "poten-
tial to be a major destabilizing element in Japan's economy."179
Since financial deregulation presupposes a population willing to
take advantage of the changes, the fact that the Japanese public
remains distinctively risk adverse in its investment decisions
and prefers the low-risk Postal Savings System would make it
difficult to achieve the reform's objective, that is, improving com-
petitiveness through liberalization and diversification of prod-
ucts and business.' 80
Finally, although the Japanese government has passed leg-
islation to inject public funds into "ailing but viable banks,"' 8 l it
has not addressed the rules and procedures for handling the
hopeless banks. As one commentator suggested, a legal regime
which gives a regulatory authority the full power to determine
the course of action when a bank is deemed insolvent is neces-
sary.18 2 The authority could either choose to restore the health
of the troubled bank by taking specified drastic measures to im-
prove its operations or place the bank under a receivership for
the purpose of restructuring or full liquidation.' 83 This ap-
proach will protect both the financial system as a whole and the
individual depositors of the troubled bank.184 The establish-
ment of the Financial Reconstruction Commission in December
of 1998 seemed to create such a regulatory authority. The Com-
176. See Jathon Sapsford, Japan Banks Feeling Push for Quick Fix, WALL
ST. J. EUR, Jan. 21, 1999, at 21.
177. See Ernest T. Patrikis, Japan's Big Bang Financial Reforms, 24
BROOK J. INT'L L. 577, 590 (1998).
178. See id.
179. Thomas F. Cargill, Asia's Financial Crisis and Japan (visited Sept. 28,
1998) <http://www.nnjc.org/jiap/events/papers/carhout.html>.
180. See Lincoln, supra note 79.
181. See Japan Adopts Banking Measures, supra note 133 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See Head, supra note 148, at 76.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 78.
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mission's ability to handle the top, nineteen banks where most of
the bad debts lie, however, remains uncertain because of the
strong opposition from the banks 8 5 and the concerns of the sys-
tematic stability to which the political leaders are greatly
attached.186
III. A POTENTIAL WAY OUT OF THE BANKING CRISIS
A. REVIVE CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SYSTEM THROUGH
FULL DISCLOSURE OF BAD DEBTS AND MAINTENANCE
OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY
The first step in alleviating the crisis is to determine the actual
status of the banks' financial affairs. To determine the banks'
condition and the outside support required, it is vital that banks
report all of their expected losses and write-offs in a prescribed
uniform manner.'8 7 The importance of such a full disclosure lies
in the fact that until the markets are convinced that the banks
and the financial supervisory body are no longer in financial
straits, they will not have confidence in the Japanese financial
system."' Initially, such a disclosure was not part of the
Obuchi program which was approved by Japan's parliament in
October, 1998.189 The Obuchi program does not require the
banks to disclose the actual value of their bad assets.190 With
the establishment of the Financial Reconstruction Commission,
Japan's banks would have to "reassess their assets and bad
loans under the Commission's strict terms."191 It is a proper
step to break away from the financial policies of the past and
avoid postponing solving the banking problem, which could re-
sult in lost international credibility and a larger financial crisis
from future bad loans.
In the meantime, Japan should consider closing insolvent
banks and injecting public funds into "ailing but viable banks."
If necessary, the viable banks should be compelled to use the
public funds to maintain capital adequacy. Capital adequacy re-
185. See Goldman Sachs, supra note 87.
186. See Head, supra note 148, at 75.
187. See The Japanese (Banking) Crisis, DRESDNER BANK TRENDS, Nov.
13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11117662.
188. See id.
189. See Peter Landers, Japan's New Banking Bill Has Plenty of Familiar
Problems, FAR E. ECO. REV. 75 (Tokyo), Oct. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL
13867113.
190. See id.
191. Japan's Bank Must Drastically Restructure, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Jan. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2526496.
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fers to the ability of a bank to face risks by relying on amounts
that have been paid in by the shareholders, together with cer-
tain other reserves. 192 Under the Basle Core Principles, bank-
ing supervisors must set prudent and appropriate minimum
capital adequacy requirements that reflect the risks that banks
undertake and must define the components of capital. 193 The
explanatory text accompanying the principle elaborates on the
importance of a bank's equity capital:
[Ilt provides a permanent source of revenue for the shareholders and
funding for the bank; it is available to bear risk and absorb losses; it
provides a base for further growth; and it gives the shareholders rea-
son to ensure that the bank is managed in a safe and sound manner.
Minimum capital adequacy ratios are necessary to protect the interests
of depositors, creditors and other stakeholders of the bank and to help
supervisors pursue the overall stability of the banking industry.
19 4
In Japan, capital inadequacy has become a big problem for
banks. 195 A senior Japanese official said that the capital reserve
levels of the top nineteen banks are so low that these banks
might be banned from operating internationally if the rules of
capital adequacy are "vigorously pursued." 96 Since bolstering
Japan's ravaged banking system is considered the single most
important factor in quelling the global financial turmoil, meet-
ing the capital adequacy requirement of the Basle Core Princi-
ples is the first step towards the achievement of such an
objective.
As to the closing of failing banks, the nationalization of the
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) is a positive step to-
wards the overhaul of the financial system.1'7 The LTCB take-
over is good news for Japan's financial system because it shows
that Japan finally has a plan to handle critically disabled finan-
cial institutions efficiently. 198 During the nationalization of the
failed banks, it is necessary to take some caution to avoid de-
stroying bad, as well as good, institutions because of lost confi-
dence in the system. 199 Admittedly, the effects of such reform in
192. See Head, supra note 148, at 81.
193. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision (April 1997) (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.bis.org
publ/index.htm>. [hereinafter Basle Core Principles]
194. See id.
195. See David E. Sanger, Japanese Tell U.S. That Their Banks Are in Big
Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998, at Al.
196. See id.
197. See Jathon Sapsford, Japan Eases Fears in Financial System, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at A19.
198. See id.
199. See Time to Wake up, supra note 102, at 27.
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the short and medium term will result in a stream of bankrupt-
cies of banks and the businesses to which they loaned money, a
decline in stock and property markets and rising unemploy-
ment.200 However, given the severity of the crisis and the eco-
nomic positioning of Japan vis-A-vis the rest of the world,
courage and prompt action are required to carry out the long-
term goal of restoring health to the whole economy. If tradi-
tional caution prevails, the country may be in for another decade
of lost growth.20 1
Another short-run measure would be cutting operating costs
and shaking up the management team. Japan needs to recon-
sider its lifetime employment practice 202 and eliminate redun-
dant employees to cut operating costs. Shareholders and
management of the banks should not be protected. 20 3 They
should lose their interest in the bank because they undertook
the risk or responsibility for the success or failure of the bank. It
is only right that they bear the consequences of their own bad
investment judgment or their poor performance. 20 4 Because
turning around a bank generally requires a new management
team unburdened by responsibility for past mistakes, Japan
needs to assign responsibility to bankers' bad decisions instead
of just having them apologize for making bad loans. 205 The Jap-
anese government, however, may find this measure hard to
carry out because of the close relationship between the govern-
ment and business.20 6 If Japan is to solve its current banking
crisis, it should be prepared to take some politically painful
steps for the sake of its economy, or even the global economy.
B. LONG-TERM HEALTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM RELIES ON
FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS
Rationalizing a financial sector by liquidating the failed
banks and restructuring the weak ones, however, can only cor-
rect some crucial immediate problems. 20 7 The long-term health
of the system relies on long-term systematic reforms. Strong
200. See Zakaria, supra note 30.
201. See Time to Wake up, supra note 102, at 28.
202. The number of Japanese bankers has fallen by only 6 percent from
1993 to 1998, and this was achieved largely through retirements. See Robert
Zielinski, The World Cup of Banking Reform, TIME INTL, Jan. 18, 1999, at 23.
203. See Head, supra note 148, at 75.
204. See id.
205. See Zielinski, supra note 202.
206. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
207. See Head, supra note 148, at 80.
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and effective bank supervision is indispensable.20 Effective su-
pervision of banking institutions is essential to achieve a strong
economic environment and financial stability.20 9 Such supervi-
sion ensures that banks operate in a safe and sound manner,
such as holding capital and reserves sufficient to support the
risks that arise in their business.210 Banking supervision
should "foster an efficient and competitive banking system that
is responsive to the public's need for quality financial services at
a reasonable cost."2 11 To achieve this objective, a supervisory
agency must have operational independence, the means and
powers to gather information and the authority to carry out its
decision. 212 It should encourage good corporate governance and
enhance market transparency and surveillance. 213 In the con-
text of the Japanese banking reform, the issues of "insider trad-
ing and connected lending" and bank transparency are
particularly important.
1. Sound Corporate Governance Requires Strict Regulations
of Insider Trading and Connected Lending
Insider trading is a situation where "a person familiar with
the inner dealings of a public company executes transactions
based on information prior to its public disclosure." 21 4 Insider
trading tends to create "competitive distortion."215 In Japan, in-
sider trading was a routine part of business until the summer of
1988 when Japan's Diet passed insider trading legislation.21 6
Insider trading once encouraged growth when Japan's market
was isolated and had relatively few participants. 217 As the
world's financial markets began to converge, the effect of repel-
ling outside participants by the insider trading practice became
unacceptable. 218
"The global interest in regulating insider trading stems
from the necessity of accurate risk assessments and confidence
208. See id.
209. See Basle Core Principles, supra note 193.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Brian Volkman, The Global Convergence of Bank Regulation and
Standards for Compliance, 115 BANKING L.J. 550, 571 (1998).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
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in financial markets."219 If insiders are allowed to take advan-
tage of their privileged information, risk assessments of the in-
siders and non-insiders could vary significantly and weaken the
confidence of anyone not privy to the inside information. 220
Although the concept of prohibiting insider trading is widely ac-
cepted, the world does not have a common standard for deter-
ring such activity mainly because of the different definitions of
insider trading.221 The inconsistency of interpretation, together
with the Japanese tradition of strong governmental relationship
with business,222 may deter foreign participation in the Japa-
nese financial markets. Because of Japan's position as the
world's second largest economy and its tradition of bank protec-
tion, vigorous competition from foreign banks is necessary to im-
prove the health of the financial system when the protection is
taken away. As discussed above, the first step towards fixing
the banking problem is to restore confidence in the system itself.
Clarification and improvement of insider trading legislation
would be helpful because confidence also comes from the market
participants' ability to accurately access consistent market infor-
mation without the fear of being disadvantaged by privileged in-
formation to competitors.
Connected lending is "the extension of credit to individuals
or firms connected to the bank through ownership or through
the ability to exert direct or indirect control."223 Without proper
regulation, connected lending could lead to significant problems
because determinations regarding the creditworthiness of the
borrower are not always objective.224 Unlike other typical capi-
talist systems where banks lend money to those companies that
are likely to repay their debts on time and in full, the Japanese
banks lend to companies with whom they have a cozy relation-
ship, whether or not they are doing well.225 Because the system
was so indiscriminate about distributing capital, the market did
not send any signals regarding the performance of the banks.226
When the Bubble Economy burst, thousands of companies had
219. Id. at 572.
220. See id.
221. See id., at 572-73.
222. See Bingman, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
223. See Basle Core Principles, supra note 193. Connected parties include a
bank's parent organization, major shareholders, subsidiaries, affiliated compa-
nies, directors and officers, etc. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Marcus Gee, The Real End of Japan Inc., THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), April 4, 1998, at D4.
226. See id.
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trouble paying their loans, and the banks got stuck with moun-
tains of bad debt. 22 7
To prevent further occurrence of imprudent lending, Japan
must enhance the regulation of lending practices. It should put
in place a supervisory regime that can independently evaluate a
bank's policies, practices and procedures "relating to the grant-
ing of loans and making of investments and ongoing manage-
ment of the loan and investment."228 Supervisors need to
ensure that individual banks maintain objective and prudent
lending policies and make their credit decisions free of conflict-
ing interest and inappropriate outside pressures.229 As the
banks' regulator, the FSA needs to effectively monitor connected
lending. It may require that "the terms and conditions of such
credits not be more favorable than credits extended to non-re-
lated borrowers under similar circumstances." 230 In light of the
close relationship between banks and other industries 231 and
the powerful influences from the Japanese government, 232 the
need for an independent supervisory regime to effectively regu-
late the banks' credit and investment policies and practices be-
comes urgent.
2. The Success of the Interaction of Prudential Supervision
and Market Disciplines Calls for Bank
Transparency
Free markets contain mechanisms that can reinforce the ef-
forts of supervisors by rewarding banks that manage risk effec-
tively and penalizing those whose risk management is inept or
imprudent.233 Market discipline, however, can only work if
market participants have access to timely and reliable informa-
tion that enables them to assess a bank's activities and the risks
inherent in those activities. 234 Moreover, for the complementary
interaction of prudential supervision and market discipline to
promote long-term stability of both individual institutions and
227. See id.
228. See Basle Core Principles, supra note 193.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See Apisit Buranakaonda, Financial Reform in Japan: "Big Bang" No
Sure Cure for the Rest of Asia, BANKOK POST, Mar. 2, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7888358.
232. See Bingman, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
233. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Bank Trans-
parency 1 (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.bis.org.publ/index.htm>.
234. See id.
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banking systems, bank transparency is indispensable.235 Im-
proved public disclosure not only enhances such interaction, but
also strengthens market participants' ability to encourage safe
and sound banking practices. 236
Transparency is "public disclosure of reliable and timely in-
formation that enables the use of that information to make an
accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition, perform-
ance, business activities, risk profile and risk management prac-
tice."237 In Japan, thanks to murky accounting principles and
imprudent risk management, the severity of the banking crisis
was covered up until early 1998.238 The banking problem is not
just the reported $600 billion in bad loans; it also involves hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in pension liabilities. 239 The lack of
public disclosure effectively handicapped the abilities of the su-
pervisory authorities and the banks to handle the problem when
it finally came to light. As the Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision noted, disclosure helps prevent both foreseen and un-
foreseen problems in banks.240 Enhanced public disclosure
allows market discipline to work earlier and more effectively,
thereby strengthening the incentives for banks to behave in a
prudent and efficient manner.241 Market discipline based on ad-
equate public disclosure can be an effective complement to su-
pervisory efforts to encourage banks to maintain sound risk
management systems and practices. 242
As to the market participants, high-quality public disclo-
sure improves their capability to make informed decisions.243
Bank transparency allows them to more accurately assess a
bank's financial strength and performance; increases the credi-
bility of information disclosed by a bank; demonstrates a bank's
ability to monitor and mange its risk exposure; and reduces
market uncertainty. 244
Disclosure alone, however, does not necessarily result in
transparency. To achieve transparency, a bank must provide
timely, accurate, relevant and sufficient qualitative and quanti-
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Bremner, supra note 132, at 137.
239. See id.
240. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 233, at 6.
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tative information that "enables users of that information to
make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and
performance, business activities, risk profile and risk manage-
ment."245 In its recommendations, the Basle Committee identi-
fied six broad categories of information to be addressed in clear
terms and appropriate details to achieve a satisfactory level of
transparency. 246 In the current context of the banking reforms,
it is necessary to emphasize the importance of disclosure of ac-
counting policies because Japanese banks use different account-
ing practices and procedures. 247 It is encouraging that the FSA
set new and strict accounting rules for the financial system.248
It helps to determine the real size of the bad debts and lay a
foundation for further structural reforms.
Admittedly, public disclosure can have potential draw-
backs. 249 In particular, when the market becomes aware of a
bank's weak position, it may overreact and push the bank out of
the market even though it is solvent in terms of net assets. 250
The market's distrust in one bank may spread to other banks
and lead to a systematic failure. 251 The potential drawbacks,
however, should not discourage transparency of the Japanese
banks. After all, banking by itself is a risky business.25 2 The
success of the reforms requires a balance of benefits and risks.
Given the background of the Japanese banking crisis, its severe
nature and the importance of reviving the financial system, the
benefits of bank transparency significantly outweigh the poten-
tial drawbacks it might bring.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Japanese Diet approved its plan to inject
public funds into the trouble-ridden banking system in 1998, one
might have expected that the Japanese banking crisis would
soon be over. Due to the complicated background and the depth
of the banking crisis, however, any speculation of a quick cure to
245. See id.
246. See id. The six categories are: financial performance; financial position;
risk management strategies and practices; risk exposures; accounting policies;
and basic business, management and corporate governance information. See
id.
247. See Bremner, supra note 132.
248. See Gillian Tett, Japan's Revitalized Financial Watchdog Starts to
Sharpen up Its Teeth, FIN TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at 4.
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[Vol. 9:269296
2000] AcuTE SYMPTOMS OF CHRONIC PROBLEMS 297
the banking system, and hence the whole economy, is unrealis-
tic. To the contrary, in the short term, the Japanese government
should take determined steps to restore confidence in the bank-
ing industry by closing insolvent banks and helping the viable
ones. At the same time, as a long-term objective, the Japanese
government should overhaul the structure of the banking indus-
try and steer its way towards internationally-accepted practices.
Especially in the areas of sound governance and bank trans-
parency, the cornerstones of a sound financial system, the Japa-
nese should exert more efforts to conform to international
standards in the era of international competition. On the one
hand, we expect the Japanese government to take prompt and
thoughtful actions to fix the banking industry for the sake of its
own economy and that of the world. On the other hand, we need
to show our patience, understanding and support for the Japa-
nese banking reform.

